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POLICY-MAKING AND CONNECTIONS TO VIOLENCE: 
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA* 
 
 
 
Marie Olson Lounsbery and Frederic S. Pearson 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the role of identity-based, or discriminatory, policy in facilitating the 
outbreak of ethnopolitical violence in India.  A discriminatory policy is the merging of 
communal group identity with the state apparatus. It is argued that as the Indian government 
enacts policies beneficial or discriminatory to particular identity groups within the country, 
other groups feel threatened.  Groups who feel disadvantaged by the policy may begin to fear for 
their own security and political interests motivating them to rebel.  When focusing on Indian 
policy and ethnopolitical violence during the period 1945 to 2000, the authors find that, 
although there are many cases of seemingly spontaneous episodes of violence, when identity-
based policies do occur, they are often followed by violence and/or protest.    
 
Introduction 
 
With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the international system seemed ready to 
experience a new era of peace.  However, the “New World Order” predicted by then US 
President George H. W. Bush turned out to be something quite different.  Although the 
occurrence of interstate war diminished substantially after 1989, internal conflicts continued to 
rage at an alarming rate throughout the world (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1999), and to put 
pressure on outside powers considering possible intervention.  Scholars who once focused their 
attention on superpower rivalry now turned to internal war, and more specifically, “ethnic 
conflict.”1 An explosion of efforts ensued to find out what causes these highly destructive and 
often intractable conflicts, how they can be managed or resolved, and ideally how to detect the 
conditions necessary or sufficient for ethno political violence before it breaks out, i.e., “early 
warning.” 
As researchers attempt to grapple with the complexity of intrastate warfare, we seek to 
contribute to our understanding of what conditions trigger violent ethno political outbreaks.  We 
propose to test, at least in one very large and diverse state, the general hypothesis that ethno 
political conflict is often a reaction to governmental policy initiatives or changes.  One key 
aspect of policy change entails what might be described as inherent discrimination, i.e., moves 
designed or structured to benefit one identity group in society at the expense of others.  Such a 
policy can be viewed as incorporating group identity into state policy.  It establishes one group 
as higher in status than others, and as a result, creates a need for disadvantaged groups to defend 
their status.   
Clearly, all government policies are designed to provide something for someone or some 
group.  It is proposed here though that policy providing systematic advantage to certain 
communities, or disadvantage to others, can be viewed as a catalyst for violence.  We use the 
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term “catalyst” advisedly, since we suppose that other factors fully account for the violence, and 
indeed we examine a few of these in relation to policy change.   
In constructing policy changes it has been argued that leaders might blunder in trying to 
alleviate social conflict through policy reform without fully considering such factors as 
economic inequalities, territorial dissatisfaction, the number, relation, size, and location of ethnic 
communities, international involvement or support, and the legacies of colonial and political 
history.  It also has been observed that aggressive and opportunistic leaders take advantage of 
such conditions and the bitterness they engender to incite violence for their own political 
purposes (Rupesinghe, 1988; Kaufman, 1996; Williams, 1994).  One expression of efforts at 
policy reform or of opportunism is the enactment of discriminatory measures, regulations, and 
legislation.   
We seek to determine if, when, and by what sequences such discriminatory policy leads 
toward or away from violence, allowing for the fact that “discrimination” can be a subjective 
concept, and indeed might even have positive effects if it empowers or “liberates” previously 
oppressed groups (often argued in the context of American affirmative action legislation).  If a 
consistent pattern of outcomes emerges for certain types of policies, such policy initiatives could 
be clear signs or signals for those interested in preventing or ameliorating social violence.  
However, it is not yet clear what types of policies have predictable effects and under what 
circumstances.   
Although some studies have hinted at the idea of policy change leading to violent civil 
conflict (Gurr, 1996; Stavenhagen, 1996), the violence is often referred to as the by-product of 
other factors.  Clearly conditions of domestic disruption can condition the ways policies are 
perceived.  For example, during the American civil war in the 1860s, the effort, however 
reluctant, to emancipate slaves, led to reported ethnic backlash among groups recruited or 
conscripted to fight in the war; the war’s economic and social dislocations, the high attrition rate 
and forced nature of the draft, may have exacerbated this pattern of ethnic and class tension, 
leading for example to anti-war riots among the lower classes in ethnically diverse New York 
City. 
Ideally one would want to conduct a study of discriminatory policy over many nations 
and time-periods.  However, the necessity of mapping a large body of policy change events and 
effects across time dictates a more focused initial approach to one country.  India presents an 
excellent case for study because of its extensive ethnic diversity, encompassing different and 
overlapping tribal, linguistic, religious, and cultural (including caste) identities spread across a 
wide and varied geography, with a long history of periodic ethnic uprisings and communal 
violence alongside efforts at reform, collaboration and regional or national cohesion.  The origin 
of much of this communalism in the contemporary context has been traced to forms of indirect 
colonial rule, pitting identity groups against each other and utilizing local traditional rulers, 
combined with the development of modern nationalism (Pandy, 1990; Barnett, 1976).  If we can 
better understand the patterns by which these processes subsequently have unfolded in this large 
and pivotal democratic state, we can formulate propositions about ethnic violence for further 
testing abroad.   
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Identity Based Violence 
 
Factors that contribute to interstate war have been documented and tested by many 
scholars in the fields of conflict studies and international relations (see Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Cashman, 1993; Midlarsky, 1989).  Unfortunately, quantitative or behavioral 
methodologists relatively neglected analysis of civil or internal wars during the Cold War period, 
except perhaps for the links between civil and interstate war (Maoz, 1989; Haas, 1968; Rummel, 
1968; Tanter, 1966; Zinnes and Wilkenfeld, 1971; Wilkenfeld, 1972).  Although this linkage 
research continues and has been increasingly helpful to the field in general, it does not reveal 
why some countries experience domestic unrest, rebellion, or uprisings and others do not. 
Those scholars who focused specifically on intrastate or civil war often dealt with how 
these conflicts end and the success or failure of negotiated settlements (Licklider, 1993 and 
1995).  At a less intense level than civil wars, scholars also have looked at internal conditions of 
communal conflict and anti-government rebellion.  Perhaps the most extensive work in this area 
is that of Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 1993), who argues that rebellion stems from politicized 
discontent, a condition he believes arises from relative deprivation.2 Ethnopolitical conflict, 
therefore, is motivated by perceived discrimination, and discontent can be exacerbated by 
economic or social conditions and mobilized by political entrepreneurs in order for internal 
unrest to occur.   
Gurr (1996) has taken his Minorities at Risk project further to develop a model for early 
warning of identity-based violence that he illustrates using data from 56 Asian minorities.  He 
has identified what he believes to be risk factors for groups already engaged in serious forms of 
rebellion.  The factors that would lead to armed violence include: collective incentives, the 
capacity for joint action, and external opportunities.  In addition to relative deprivation, other 
incentives for communal uprising include a loss of collective autonomy and previous experience 
of repression by dominant groups, all factors that can relate to or be expressed in governmental 
policy.3  The conditions that Gurr identifies as shaping regime responses to collective action are 
a history of elite reliance on coercion, duration and strength of the democratic experience, and 
the regime’s domestic power and resources.  These risk factors, as Gurr (1996) explains, are not 
to be used as predictors of violent conflict, but rather can be coded in order to provide a country 
with a risk score, similar to our notion of looking at policy change as a catalyst. 
Beyond the important concept of relative deprivation itself, the next question is what 
causes sufficient discontent or insecurity that individuals would be willing to politicize, mobilize, 
and possibly fight to the death?  Gurr’s risk factor model is based on discontent forming from 
economic, political, and cultural discrimination, as well as a history of state repression or lost 
political autonomy.  All of these factors can be viewed as some sort of group discrimination.  
Although Gurr acknowledges that a major change in the structure of a political regime may be a 
factor in violent civil conflict, his model posits that this change provides a window of 
opportunity for identity groups that are already experiencing discrimination.   
Elaborating on the window of opportunity thesis, we speculate that governmental policy 
rather than or in conjunction with institutional change also might spark group discontent/fear and 
lead to violence.  In a presidential address to the International Studies Association, Gurr (1994), 
analyzing conflicts during the 1993-94 period, developed the importance of political changes 
within governments as a condition present prior to war.  He found that half of the conflicts 
occurred after “power transitions” which compromised any one of three different events: a 
national upheaval (as defined by Harff, 1986), revolutionary changes in power, or transitions to 
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democracy.  In addition, these conflicts are more intense than conflicts that do not follow power 
transitions.  Upheavals, revolutionary power shifts, and democratic transitions all may entail or 
relate to specific policy moves, though such moves, of course, can occur without these major 
institutional changes.  In the Indian context the 1977 parliamentary election, ousting the 
Congress Party after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian and ethnically manipulative 
policies, is often seen as a key turning point in the sustenance of Indian democracy (Weiner, 
1978).  Thus it may not be so much the revolutionary changes in power or institutions per se as 
the policies and measures officially adopted before or after the political transition that makes the 
situation volatile.   
This study, therefore, is designed to determine which of these various types of factors has 
the greatest impact on subsequent identity based violence.  It seems clear from Gurr’s research 
that internal power dynamics are a significant factor, but it is not clear whether they always are a 
precondition of violence.  Using a case study format on information provided by area specialists, 
Stavenhagen (1996) argues that violence may be inherent in the process of state-formation and 
nation building.  In order to understand the roots of the conflict one has to look at how the 
modern state was originally established.  A modern state relates to the different ethno-cultural 
groups within its borders through constitutional provisions, electoral systems, legislation or 
political culture and practice.  The nation-state thus often has a dominant identity group (or 
related groups) and one or more subordinate identity groups.  This creates a struggle by the 
lower status group(s) for recognition.  Stavenhagen also argues that these conflicts include two 
competing notions of the term ‘nation.’  The modern state system requires that nations show a 
united front, yet identity groups, when asked to conform or assimilate, often feel stronger loyalty 
to their “identity nation.”  This can present grave challenges to a large union such as that of the 
Indian subcontinent.4 
Although Stavenhagen does not present an early warning system as Gurr does, he argues 
that in order to overcome the inherently conflictive nature of the nation-state system, states must 
abandon their emphasis on assimilation.  He further proposes that democratic states are better 
able to prevent these types of conflicts because they tend to de-emphasize assimilation and 
ethnic politics.  However, as India clearly shows, democracy itself might be caught up in the 
turmoil of defining group rights and responsibilities and might or might not be able to quell the 
tendencies toward violence in specific instances.  Thus, Sisk (1996) argues that despite the 
attractiveness of democracy as a form of government, it might not always be more peaceful, 
particularly in multicultural societies.  Democracy, according to Sisk, will create a security threat 
when a win at the polls means a physical threat to the minority; this has been seen in recent 
years, for example, in fears of an emerging democratically elected Islamic state in Algeria.  In 
countries where hostilities between competing identity groups are high, the will of the majority 
may mean policies of assimilation or extinction.  As a result, he discusses the benefits of 
consociational approaches (i.e. power sharing) to identity-based conflicts at the national level.   
States such as India have experimented with these approaches, in the form of office-
holding and educational quotas, with varied and not always peaceful outcomes.  Such quotas, 
reserved places, and related set-aside policies themselves can become causes of contention, 
conflict, or riotous violence.  India’s long struggle with policies toward the “scheduled” 
classes— “Untouchable” castes—illustrates these outcomes, with other castes periodically 
refusing to cooperate in the system (Joshi, 1982).  In addition, India has evolved complex and 
subtle norms related to assimilation, reflecting a tension between those who went through the 
independence struggle for the united homeland and those in regional areas who were then 
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expected to submerge their local identities to the national myth.5  One expression of this tension 
is in the area of language law, where a system evolved to recognize Hindi as the nominal 
national language, but to allow local languages to flourish and to revert to English at times as a 
lingua franca.  One student of Indian democracy has noted that ethnic separatist movements, as 
seen among the Tamils, Sikhs, and Muslims across the years, are to be expected as expressions 
of self-determination in multicultural democracies, and that they can be accommodated 
depending upon how well the central authority is institutionalized and upon the willingness of 
leaders, central authorities, and ruling groups to share power and resources with the mobilized 
protesters (Kohli, 1997).  Thus a combination of institutional capability and policy reform is seen 
as the key to stability.6 
As with assimilation, resource distribution can become a crucial bone of contention in 
post-colonial societies,7 but how governmental leaders legislate that distribution, again the 
expression of or reaction to inequality via policy, is crucial to understanding the causes of violent 
civil conflict.  Either mass-led or elite-led policy demands can lead to violence despite their 
vastly different motivations. 
In sum, those who have examined the history of ethnic relations in India have noted 
many accommodations and norms aimed at managing tensions even apart from governmental 
policy, often quite successfully.  Manor (1996, pp.461-462) shows how four different strands of 
ethnic identity—religious, language, tribal/caste, and regional tribal—cross-cut in the Indian 
context and how Indians tend to give priority to different levels of identity as circumstances 
change, thus blurring or diminishing permanent conflict fault lines.  The Japanese also have 
displayed the ability to combine ethno-cultural traits, for example adopting multiple religious 
practices. 
Because Indian society is so heterogeneous, and because the country and its 
population are so large, people. . .have a wide array of identities available to 
them.  These include at least three different kinds of caste identities. . ., religious 
identities. . .,and identifications with clans and lineages—as well as linguistic, 
class, party, urban/rural, national, regional, subregional and local identities, and 
sometimes varying types of ‘tribal’ identities too.  The crucial point is that Indians 
tend not to fix on any one of these identities fiercely and permanently, as groups 
in places like Sri Lanka have done. (p. 463) 
 
Discriminatory Policy Change 
 
While cross-cutting identities are reassuring for Indian democratic stability, periodic 
scenes of frenzied communal killing, raids, and counter raids still leave us with the question of 
when the pattern of live and let live breaks down, when the cross-cutting buffers lose their 
cushion, and when polarization becomes more acute.  One suspects again that policy moves have 
something to do with this timing, along with exogenous or systemic pressures such as economic 
change or institutional breakdown.8  Of course as Manor (1996, p. 465) notes, because of the 
diversity of ethnic cues, such as Hinduism’s multiple gods and texts, even when politicians try to 
enforce disruptive or polarizing policy changes, as in the efforts by the Hindu right to make the 
god Ram the pre-eminent deity across all India, there is considerable natural resistance.   
Those who have studied Indian ethnic and particularly religious violence present a 
pattern of episodic ups and downs (Manor, 1996, pp. 467-468).  “These marked fluctuations in 
levels of religious violence are intimately connected to the fluidity with which people in India 
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shift their preoccupations from one identity to another (p. 467).” But they also at times are 
related to policy irritants such as Indira Gandhi’s machinations to weaken ethnic opponents by 
dividing them and pitting potential opponents against each other in an overall pattern of power 
centralization (Manor, 1996, pp. 471-472).9 
Generally, then, this view opens the whole question of the state’s role in fomenting or 
diminishing inter-group tensions and violence.  This is illustrated in the history of Indian 
language policy.  As with Manor’s contention about crosscutting identities, it has been argued 
that language diversity both within and between Indian states precludes a forced homogenization 
and reinforces pluralism.  Fearing the possible breakup of the state in the 1950s, Jawaharlal 
Nehru resisted Congress pressures to redraw state boundary lines to conform to language 
differences; he hoped to avoid secessionist movements by intermixing language groups 
throughout.  Thus in a sense non-policy change represented a forceful policy to preserve the 
newly independent Indian Union.  Still, boundaries were occasionally redrawn along linguistic 
lines, though according to Manor (1996, p. 466), the other dividing traits among common 
language speakers held sway and prevented any single Indian state from moving forcefully for 
separation.  Group based secessionist movements have formed in the Northeast, Punjab during 
the 1980s, and Kashmir, and the state authorities have alternated between sometimes clumsy 
repression and halting efforts at reform, sometimes compounding problems as in recent ideas 
about enforcing a national identity card system to stifle cross-border tribal infiltration, without 
definitively resolving the discontent.   
After reviewing the literature, it seems reasonable that certain types of policy change may 
in fact be a key to understanding violent civil conflict. Olzak and Tsutsui (1998) link non-violent 
protest and violent uprisings to three sets of variables reflecting: world system influences, 
national civil rights policies, and the state’s international networks.  They predict for example 
that declining levels of internal inequality might intensify ethnic mobilization and strife as 
threatened groups or classes dig in their heels (they predict this to be the case more in states of 
the economic “core” of world politics than in the disadvantaged “periphery”), and that countries 
granting more civil liberties might suffer higher levels of ethno political violence, though 
perhaps lower levels of non-violent protest, because of the loosening of restraints and repression 
(up to a point of satisfaction with greatly expanded rights).  Inequality and human rights, of 
course, are both subject to policy reforms and allocations.  Findings from this multi-national 
study (pp. 706-712), though, cast doubt on the hypothesized relationships about effects of 
inequality and freedom in the world’s core and periphery, although violence levels in the core 
were higher than often predicted by those who merely assume that poverty breeds protest and 
rebellion.   
This evidence leads us to hypothesize that shifts in governmental policy that either 
benefit or threaten a dominant group in a society solidify group reaction; dominant groups 
fearing lost ground or subordinate groups fearing extinction and suppression are motivated to 
acquire countervailing power, territory, security, etc. (Horowitz, 1985).   
Polarization through state policy making can occur in two ways, as we have seen in the 
literature: (1) by pretending that group differences do not exist or are unimportant, thereby 
seeking to homogenize the society; or (2) by first recognizing different identity groups but then 
incorporating those differences into policy in a way which systematically discriminates against 
certain groups.  In either case, intra-group bonds are strengthened and inter-group bonds are 
weakened.  The group, or groups, that expect or experience policy discrimination begin to 
distance themselves from the dominant group that is seen as benefiting unduly.  With distance, 
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there tends to be a lack of communication; therefore, barriers are created that make resolving 
tensions difficult (Lake and Rothchild, 1996).  In societal polarization, groups do not maintain 
the crosscutting ties or allegiances that limit conflict potential (Ross, 1993) and have been shown 
to be so important for India. 
Depending upon circumstances, the supposed advantages provided the dominant group 
might cause a fear of extinction or a fear of assimilation in the others.  In an analysis of Bolivia, 
Albó (1994) argues that society was organized as if everyone belonged to the dominant group; 
this created the potential for violent Bolivian conflict by denying the relevance of those who did 
not belong to the Hispanic culture.  This again is a pattern reminiscent of feared ethnocide and is 
a stronger form of fear than that perhaps picked up by Olzak and Tsutsui’s measures.  Some 
countries, such as Turkey, do not readily recognize the multi-cultural characteristic of their 
nation; therefore, policies designed to homogenize the state create fear of fatal assimilation, as 
among Kurds and Armenians.  Other states’ policies, as in Rwanda and Burundi, are designed 
specifically to rid the country, or parts thereof, of one or more identity groups.  This obviously 
generates a fear of extinction.  The two types of fear are not mutually exclusive.  Forced 
assimilation can also be viewed as a form of extinction.  The “bottom line” is that such policies 
generate fear that certain identity groups will not be able to survive or thrive within their 
homeland (Rothman, 1997). 
It is interesting to note that although inter-group violence is still prevalent in India—
indeed in incidents such as the widespread Hindu attacks on Muslims in Gujarat state in the 
summer of 2002 as a response to perceived Muslim terror on railroads and in Kashmir and New 
Delhi—the general trend appears to have been toward expression of such fears and resentments 
mainly in violence directed at the state.  
“Diverse groups do not simply vent their anger at the state but often also hold it 
responsible for the injustices they seek to address.  Hindu nationalists allege that 
the central government appeases the Muslim minority; the upper-caste youths 
who 
 immolated themselves in 1990 accused the government of discriminating against 
the so-called forward castes. . .; and regional movements demanding greater 
rights to self-determination have accused the national government of 
discriminatory allocation of resources and undue political interference at the state 
level.” (Basu and Kohli, 1997, p. 321).10 
Thus, the central government has come to be seen, accurately or not, increasingly as the 
repository of policymaking (either direct or indirect) that for better or worse, can affect the 
balance among ethnic communities.  In the case of rioting against caste emancipation policy, for 
example: 
“. . .all of these seemingly diverse examples of conflict—over urban jobs and 
education, land, and the ritual purity of the village well—do indeed prove to have 
much in common.  Each in its own way is a dispute over the Indian “social 
contract” and the state’s role in enforcing that contract.  The issue in these cases 
is not so much ‘law and order’ as ‘whose law, whose order.’ (Joshi, 1982, p. 682). 
In India as well, the situation is complicated in that,  
Many ‘communal’ riots have indeed been precipitated by discord between 
provincial and central governments and between local and national 
administrators.  In other instances. . .community leaders and state representatives 
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have worked together to prevent or contain violence. (Basu  and Kohli, 1997, p. 
322).11 
 
Discriminatory policies might consist of one specific measure or a series or repetition of 
enforcement actions, decisions, laws, rules or regulations.  Of course as noted, the mere proposal 
of such policies might also have its effects. Discussion or adoption of the discriminatory policy 
is volatile because of what it symbolizes to the potentially disadvantaged group or groups; 
therefore the actual number of policies adopted is not necessarily a factor in predicting violence, 
but their sequence and timing might be.   
Relative deprivation, economic disparities and hardships, rising expectations and 
discontent play a role in magnifying the effects of discriminatory policy change.  The key 
question is whether the proposed or enacted policy keeps certain members of a society from 
obtaining their “rightful” capabilities and aspirations.  It is not even necessary that policy reflects 
the intent of discrimination for violence to follow; if the policy symbolizes discrimination for the 
dominant or subordinate, the group may respond based on threat perception alone.  Groups 
which are being discriminated against in reference to others or which have been advantaged in 
the past but now find their status threatened by social trends or more pointedly by governmental 
reforms are more likely to rebel violently than groups that previously had not hoped for or 
experienced advancement.  
General discontent results from all of these processes particularly when newly 
discriminating measures are adopted.12  Such changes will tend to shake up the status quo, 
affording or seeming to afford new and special status to some groups; others will experience 
threats (physical or existential) and hostility.13  Indian policies aimed at emancipating the 
“Untouchables” for example are seen by many traditional elites as threatening the underpinnings 
of the entire social system and therefore are strongly resisted even as they are passed into law by 
a concerned national parliament and a party system that might depend on a massive vote among 
the poor (Joshi, 1982, p.682).  Thus, policies that threaten the status quo might be the most likely 
to breed not just protest but outright violence, and reactions to such “threatening” policies can 
breed strange alliances, as between richer and poorer higher caste Indians. 
Obviously, not all ethnically related policy decisions will result in civil violence.  Certain 
variables would seem to be crucial, especially when incorporated into official policy.  As noted, 
discriminatory policy changes are those that could systematically advantage one group within a 
society and disadvantage another.  The key policies likely to have this effect are related to 
language, religion, educational, economic (e.g., job access), and political status (such as land 
holding and citizenship rights).  These variables are not mutually exclusive; a group might feel 
that language policy would also disadvantage them politically and economically, for example.  
Clearly, policies can involve more than one type of reform at once and do not happen in a 
vacuum.  Numerous factors might contribute to the adoption of a discriminatory policy or deter 
such a policy from adoption.  Other factors could either dampen or magnify a policy’s likelihood 
of provoking violence.  For purposes of comparison, in this analysis we also record non-
discriminatory or non-identity policy changes, both proposed and enacted.  
In our analysis we also allow for the possibility that various types of identity-based 
policy can have either destructive or constructive effects, and that they can be seen subjectively 
as either harmful or beneficial. Therefore, we introduce the concept of “positive discriminatory 
policy,” which is taken to mean a tendency to benefit or protect the minority or traditionally 
disadvantaged against the majority or traditionally advantaged population in a given 
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circumstance. “Negative discriminatory policy” would have the converse effect of protecting or 
benefiting the majority or advantaged. We wish to see whether it matters if discrimination is 
positive or negative in predicting the probability of violent or non-violent reaction. 
Some studies have shown that moves in certain policy domains might breed more 
tendencies to violent reaction. Among these, for example, language policy has been cited as 
potentially volatile in a state like India. Below we review expectations regarding some of these 
domains. 
• Language.  Often states do not recognize the importance of linguistic differences in 
maintaining domestic peace.  For example, in countries such as Latvia and Moldova after the 
cold war ended, state language reform disadvantaged those, such as Russians, that did not 
speak the primary national language or did not consider it their first language.  In a 
multiethnic society such as India’s with several prevalent languages, national or regional 
language legislation and policy carries great portent.  Horowitz (1985, p. 219) argues that 
when a particular language is provided an exclusive official status it becomes a symbol of 
domination and thus presumably a great cause of bitterness and resentment of the type that 
can spur violence.  Cultural fear of domination may, in fact, play a large role in contributing 
to group level rebellion, since group members feel they might lose control of their way of life 
(Donnelly, 1996).  In a study of India and Northern Ireland, Bostock (1997) identified 
“language grief” (the anticipation of or reaction to language loss or extinction) as a major 
contributor to conflict.  On the other hand, Laitin (1993) finds the potential for fighting over 
language, especially in India and he would argue, controversially, Sri Lanka, to be muted 
because this issue almost automatically leads to a bargained outcome.  It is hypothesized 
here, for purposes of study, that because of India’s linguistic diversity and the dampening of 
linguistic polarization across Indian states, language policy reform will be less volatile than 
other forms of perceived policy discrimination.  
• Religion.  The processes involving religion and violent civil conflict are similar to those of 
language.  The same sense of domination and discrimination occurs.  With the end of the 
Cold War, and the increased interdependent nature of the international system, it seemed 
likely that economic concerns would take priority over religious differences.  However, some 
scholars argue that the societal importance of religion is growing despite increased global 
economic interdependence (Bangura, 1994; Haynes, 1995).  Reinforcing the salience of 
religion in conflict, Reynal-Querol (2002) tested the notion that religiously diverse 
multicultural states will be more violence prone than linguistically diverse states, with 
findings that religious polarization and anamist diversity (number of followers of anamist 
culture) do in fact explain incidence of civil war better than linguistic polarization.  It follows 
from her work (2001) that consociational policies protecting minorities work better than 
majoritarian democracy to keep ethnic cleavages at bay.   
 Both the aforementioned caste controversy and the Sikh and Kashmir disputes in India show 
how aspects of religion and religious practice, as in the controversy and violence surrounding 
the sanctity of the Golden Temple of Amritsar, become politicized as forms of nationalism 
leading to violence.  It is often difficult to determine exactly when a religious movement 
becomes a political movement.  One must look for various forms of organized resistance, 
campaigns or uprisings, the use of sanctuaries, and note the counter tendencies of 
government to enforce policies on religious groups.  Thus it is hypothesized here that 
religious policy, because of its increasing politicization, will be the area of Indian political 
life most subject to violent ethnic outbreaks.   
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• Economic and Political Status.  Gurr (1994) has measured economic and political 
discrimination as variables that he considers important in studying disadvantaged minorities. 
Groups unable to satisfy their needs within the system will seek satisfaction in some other 
way.  When governmental policy is seen as the source of discrimination, or is blamed for 
failing to solve economic ills in a context where scapegoating of other ethnicities is possible, 
the result can be inter-ethnic or anti-government violence. Economic and political policies 
would include regulations and legislation dictating land and resource rights, employment and 
educational opportunities, as well as affecting citizenship or denying autonomy rights.   
 
 Various significant political events were included in the study for exploratory purposes.   
Because of the economic stresses in a country of India’s size and the still unresolved rights of 
minorities in some regions (such as the Northeast), it is hypothesized that economic and political 
reforms will follow religion as India’s next most destabilizing policy domain. 
 It is argued here that discriminatory policies are neither necessary nor sufficient “causes” 
of ethno political violence.  When seeking to explain such a complex phenomenon, it is 
important to recognize that no one factor alone could claim responsibility.  Certainly the policy 
environment is important to keep in mind when assessing actual policy impact.  As a result, the 
current study incorporates two policy environmental factors as contextual variables:  executive 
party shift and economic fluctuation.   
 Several studies have identified the importance of regime change as a precipitant of civil 
violence.  As noted earlier, Gurr (1994) included “power transitions” as a strong predictor of 
such violence.  It seems feasible that such situations might open the door to possible identity-
based policy changes as indicated earlier.  Similarly, other scholars have focused specifically on 
democratization, finding positive correlation between semi-democratic regimes and violence 
(Hegre, et al., 2001; Henderson and Singer, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000).  India, however, has 
remained strongly democratic, for the most part, according to Gurr (1997) and the Polity IV 
democracy project.  On the other hand, party shifts have occurred.  As a result, the policy-to-
violence linkage will be explored in relation to executive leadership changes. 
 In addition, several scholars have identified economic factors, and particularly downturns 
as important in explaining the incidence of civil violence.  Stringent economic conditions 
exacerbate inter-group tensions and governmental resentments over scarce employment 
opportunities.  Indeed, Kaufman (1996) has argued that one cannot motivate economically 
satisfied people to rebel.  Logically, as state resources become scarce, the threat of ethno 
political violence is more probable.  Further, we might expect governments to enact more 
discriminatory policies during economic down cycles as individuals within government seek to 
secure constricting resources for their own identity group.  As a result, the policy-to-violence 
linkage will also be analyzed in relation to India’s economic fluctuations. 
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Research Methodology 
 
Ethno political violence among groups and by and against the government constitutes the 
dependent variable in this study.  Incidents of civil violence as well as various discriminatory 
policy changes in India were culled from US State Department country reports, as well as from 
the Political Handbook of the World, and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives Online.  We chose 
to combine sources in order to reduce single source bias in scholarship and media reports and to 
maximize reported events through triangulation.   However, we recognize that these all three are 
Western sources and as such potentially might miss or distort the extent or subtext of Asian 
events.  However, Keesing’s, the source that produced the largest number of accounts, has 
through the years tended to specialize in Afro-Asian politics, and presents unusually detailed and 
thorough reports.14   
Our data collection approach involved searching sources for any incident of ethnically 
related economic, social or political policy change and/or incidents of political violence within 
the state; thus the units of analysis for this study entail event sequences.  Once identified, the 
sequence of events surrounding the episode of violence or policy change (or both if they 
occurred as predicted) was coded.  For comparative purposes, we also coded sequence of events 
surrounding mass-based political protest.  For example, if a report in Keesing’s relayed the 
information that violent riots had occurred as a result of protests showing opposition to a 
recently enacted language law, the sequence coded would be a discriminatory policy change 
followed by protest and ethno political violence.  As one can imagine, there are many event 
sequence possibilities in such a project.  These possibilities include cases where a discriminatory 
policy change did not involve violence, where ethno political violence occurred without policy 
change, as well as cases where the two occurred in sequence. 15   
Reports surrounding such events for three months time were then coded to reveal 
sequences whereby policy initiatives, protests, and violence either did or did not follow each 
other.16  Thus it was possible to specify policies that were preceded or followed by protest or 
rebellion or state repression and those that were not.  Likewise we identified acts of protest or 
violence (e.g., assassinations or hate crimes) that were or were not related to ethnic policy 
moves.  If ethno-cultural violence or protest were not preceded by a detectable policy move, the 
case would be coded as ‘no political event’ followed by identity-based violence in the form of 
riot, etc.  Thus we were able to specify violence that did not appear to stem from governmental 
policy moves as well as that which did.  The goal of such coding methods is to eliminate 
spurious coding association.  Admittedly, the sequence determinations are based upon second 
hand reports typically from journalists in the field.  Such reports may be subject to bias or 
misinformation.  It can be argued, however, that the benefit of the closer association coding 
mechanisms employed here outweigh the threat of bias or misinformation. 
Record was made of all reported mass-based acts of civil violence, identity-based policy 
changes, and political protests, organized strikes, or demonstrations between the period 1947 and 
2000.  We also recorded major economic crises or downturns as a contextual variable when 
noted in the sources identified above.  In dealing with violence, we were not concerned with any 
particular casualty threshold, but rather with violent reaction or outbursts that could entail riots, 
bombings, armed attacks, acts of terrorism, etc.   
The label “discriminatory” is used if a policy, regulation, or official governmental act 
affects ethno-cultural status, as in language, religion, culture and culturally-based political rights, 
economic and resource allocations.  Thus measures regarding the status of language, religion, 
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citizenship, employment, political participation and cultural/regional autonomy can be 
considered as positively or negatively discriminating.  As noted we coded for proposed as well 
as implemented policies.  For heuristic purposes, then, a national policy that declared Hindi the 
state language would be coded negatively (i.e. from the viewpoint of the minority).  On the other 
hand, a policy that provided autonomy for a certain minority group, or which allowed for 
multiple language use would, in most circumstances, be coded positively.  Both, however, are 
examples of discriminatory policy changes and could result in violence, either by the 
disadvantaged minority or by the embittered or insecure majority or by the government.  
Therefore, we will analyze cases where either negative or positive policy changes, or both, might 
have set off violence.17  
Coding episodes of violence in India over more than 50 years is challenging.  For 
example, violence of a certain type can recur several times.  Certain regions of the country, such 
as Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast, also can be viewed as having episodes of violence 
repeatedly and nearly continuously for years at a time.  In such cases, the outbreak of violence or 
a renewed outbreak after a lull was considered a new event to be coded. On the other hand, 
ongoing or repeated battles in these areas were not coded as separate new events.18  Finally, as 
noted, we recorded cases with non-violent outcomes if we found a prior ethno-political policy or 
protest.  We assume that any other non-violence outcome, say following no policy moves, is not 
pertinent to this study.  
Contextual variables included in the study are executive leadership change and economic 
fluctuation.  Executive leadership change is considered to have occurred when there was a 
change in the position of prime minister.  This information is available through the Indian 
Embassy at www.indiaembassy.org.  In order to assess the proposed policy-to-violence 
relationship and leadership change, a series of figures are utilized identifying when 
discriminatory policies occurred in relation to leadership change.  In order to identify a possible 
connection between party shift and the policy-to-violence linkage, the figures included below 
also make the distinction between a party shift versus a prime minister shift when they are 
different. 
Economic fluctuation is analyzed in a similar fashion.  In order to effectively identify the 
ups and downs of India’s economy, we measure percent change in gross domestic product from 
previous year.  These figures are derived from International Financial Statistics.19  This variable 
is analyzed with the more reliable policy change data for the years 1960-2000. 
 
Findings 
 
Project data collection resulted in 200 cases of significant political events (or related 
events in a series) or episodes of violence.20  During the 1947-2000 period, we found 79 
instances (outbreaks or renewals) of ethno political violence in India, where violence came 
either as the first incident or as a direct result (specified or indicated in the accounts) of a 
policy or a single precipitating event.  We found an additional 25 cases where violence came as 
the end result of a long chain of events, including ethnic policies or protests, constituting what 
we called “subsequent violence.”  Twenty of these latter cases were identity-based violence, 
and five were non-identity based. 
Contrary to the study’s basic hypothesis of a firm link between discriminatory policy 
moves and violence, of the 79 original violent incidents, 48 (61%) were preceded by ‘no 
event,’ meaning they could be associated directly with no particular policy change or political 
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event, ethnic or not.  Many of these seemingly spontaneous incidents appeared to be related to 
general patterns of violence within the country.  For example, there were several entries related 
to Hindu-Muslim fighting that might have originated because of friction in the streets or over 
issues such as disrespect of religious holy places (especially mosques).  Another source of such 
episodes dealt with violence against lower social group or caste members, particularly the 
Harijans or Untouchables.   
In some instances such vengeful fighting or communal attacks could have related to 
prior objectionable policies.  Some disputes regarding the use or building of religious 
institutions, for example, could relate to older prevailing governmental policies and regulations 
or to the lack of policy reform, regulation, or enforcement to protect the religious community’s 
interests.  However, if we could not identify a specific proximate policy initiative, we did not 
code for the relevance of such older policies and practices or for policy failures or omissions.  
Of the 31 initial identity-based violent incidents preceded by detectable policy moves, 
only eight (26%) were preceded by discriminatory policy changes, either positive or negative.  
An additional three events of ethno political violence were preceded by proposed 
discriminatory policies that were not yet adopted.  Thus, in all less than 40% of original violent 
mass based incidents had discriminatory policy antecedents.  Interestingly, nine (29%) of the 
identity-based violence episodes were first protests or demonstrations that then became violent, 
so that protests seemed about as likely as policy changes to lead to or warn of violence.  
Obviously, factors such as police responses to such demonstrations can affect the turn to 
violence.  Various other events, such as a reported arrest, death or assassination, as well as 
migration patterns preceded the remainder of initial violent incidents. 
Looking at the 25 cases of “subsequent violence,” i.e., violence coming after a longer 
sequence of events, we found that eight (32%) were preceded by some form of identity policy 
initiative (whether positive, negative, or “neutral”).  Nine resulted from prior governmental 
repression, while 11 (44%) were preceded by some form of identity protest.  Of course since 
these are sequences, a given act of violence could have been related to a combination of the 
above factors.  The most common such sequence (four cases) was for discriminatory policy to 
lead to subsequent protest and then to violent outbreaks. 
Thus, on the whole and looked at from the standpoint of violence, discriminatory policy 
changes preceded the outbreaks in only about one third to two-fifths of the cases.  Looked at 
from the standpoint of discriminatory policy, however, there was a higher frequency of 
subsequent violence.  In all there were 40 cases of discriminatory policy in the data, both 
negative and positive (one case neutral) in India during the years under study.  Interestingly and 
perhaps indicating India’s democratic tendencies, the majority of those cases were of the 
positive variety (28 cases or 70%).  It seems apparent that the Indian national or state 
governments have repeatedly attempted to alleviate identity-based tension via various sorts of 
positive discriminatory policies or reforms.  For example, there were many examples of 
devolution, such as providing full statehood for Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and 
Meghalaya in 1970, as well as examples of policy designed to recognize languages other than 
Hindi at the state level.   
Recall our assumption that positive discrimination will have more salutary effects on 
violence than negative discrimination.  Of the 28 cases of positive discriminatory policy, the 
majority (17 or 61%) was not followed by violence or protest.  Positive discrimination led to 
identity-based protest in eight cases (29%) and to identity violence in only three instances 
(11%).  In three more cases a sequence beginning with positive discrimination led through 
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several subsequent events to violence.  However, as seen in Table 1, the fact then that some 
40% of the time angry mass response appears likely even after “positive” policy reforms should 
give decision-makers pause. 
 
Table 1 
Positive Discriminatory Policy Change 
 
28 of 40 (70%) discriminatory policy changes were positive in nature 
8 of 28 (29%) positive policies were followed by identity-based protest 
3 of 28 (11%) positive policies were followed by ethno political violence 
 
Negative policy discrimination had somewhat more destabilizing effects.  Twelve of the 
discriminatory policies were coded as negative,21 and unlike positive discrimination nearly two-
thirds of these instances were followed either by ethno political violence or political protest.  
Indeed violence occurred in five instances (42%) with protest coming in three more (25%) cases.  
Thus violence was a relatively more frequent outcome for negative than for positive 
discrimination.  While a variety of factors might contribute to ethno political violence, it seems 
clear (Table 2) that when negative policy discrimination does occur, it tends to be followed 
rather predictably (two-thirds of the Indian cases) by violence and/or protest.  Indeed the violent 
effects were rather immediate in the case of negative discrimination, not going through long 
sequences or chains of events. 
 
Table 2 
Negative Discriminatory Policy Change 
 
12 of 40 (30%) discriminatory policies were negative in nature 
3 of 12 (25%) of negative policies were followed by identity-based protest 
5 of 12 (42%) of negative policies were followed by ethno political violence 
 
   Several conflicts theorists (Sisk, 1996; Horowitz, 1985) have discussed the 
possibility of devolution and federalism as a means of effectively dealing with such 
heterogeneous societies as India.  The fact that India has made serious efforts to localize 
government for that reason, and yet still experienced high levels of identity-based violence raises 
questions about the assumed benefits of devolution, or about whether the correct policies were 
engaged.  Devolution generally would be considered positive in our categorization, and as such 
perhaps did not often lead directly to violence, but it also did not preclude violence arising from 
negative policies in the realm.  Even when the national government provided local control and 
went through the pains of creating separate linguistic states, such as those in the Punjab 
Reorganization Bill of 1966, violence continued to be seen (e.g., in Punjab and New Delhi).  It 
seems that devolutionary policies can have the effect of creating “minorities within minorities” 
or even generating majorities who perhaps do not see the need to accommodate yet another 
linguistic community.  Yet in other circumstances, the subdivision of states into still smaller 
autonomous units might well relieve some of these tensions. 
Further research is, therefore, needed focusing specifically on the benefits and drawbacks 
of devolution, decentralization, of power sharing in diverse populations.  Although positive 
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discriminatory policies did in some cases lead to violence, they appeared to do so less frequently 
than their negative counterparts.  There were eight cases of proposed discriminatory policies, 
with seven of them of the ‘positive’ variety.  Five of the eight (63%) resulted in eventual 
violence and an additional two in identity-based protest.  Proposed events thus appear to be even 
more volatile than their enacted counterparts, perhaps because groups become alarmed and take 
the occasion to campaign against adoption through violent means. 
On four occasions discriminatory policy actually followed rather than preceded violence 
or protest.  For example, in Assam, 1960 linguistic riots led to a decision to make Assamese the 
official language of the state.  In two other instances previously objectionable policy was 
reversed after protests.  This type of sequence, however, was less prevalent than one might have 
assumed, and therefore indicates that the relationship between policy and violence tends to be 
uni-directional, i.e., to lead from policy to violence or protest.  Indian authorities may have 
proven less responsive in policy terms to popular outcry or uprising than democratic theory 
might predict.  Over time and given repeated incidents of communal violence, local or national 
governments might revert to old “learned” responses, might become less open to reform, or 
might adopt new approaches to policing or enforcement. 
We must note that “governmental policy” in India implies either national or regional 
(state) policies.  We might wonder whether one or the other is more prone to produce violent 
reaction or opposition, especially in light of the devolution hypothesis.  Therefore, we separated 
out our discriminatory policies according to their regional content, listing regionally based 
policies, national policies with regional content, and national policies.22  In Table 3 we show 
quite clearly that regionally oriented identity policies, whether passed by states or national 
authorities, are more likely to generate violence than are national policies.  It could be that such 
regional policies are meant to deal with more intractable difficulties and more entrenched 
violence to begin with, and therefore are more violence prone, or that they are in and of 
themselves more controversial and threatening to minorities.  Further study of this question will 
be required. 
 
 
Table 3 
Sources and Focus of Discriminatory Policies 
 
 Total Led to 
Violence 
Led to 
Protest 
Regional Policies 17 7 3 
National Policies with 
Regional Content 
10 2 3 
National Policies 16 1 6 
Chi-square = 15.50, significant < .01 
 
During the data collection and analysis it became apparent that language policy has been 
a volatile issue in Indian history, but our hypothesis was that it would not be the most volatile of 
the policy domains.  There were 27 event sequences having to do with language issues, including 
12 linguistic discriminatory policy changes and five proposed discriminatory policy changes.  Of 
those policies enacted (Table 4), 10 were positive in nature with seven of those followed by 
ethno political violence and an additional three by identity-based protest.  This illustrates the 
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numerous governmental attempts in India to give representation to the many linguistic groups 
within the country, and the fact that positive policy changes produced markedly less linguistic 
violence than proposed or negative changes.  In fact, there were only two cases of negative 
linguistic policy with both experiencing ethno political violence in their aftermath.  Further, 
there were five proposed linguistic policies with three followed by violence. 
 
Table 4 
Linguistic Discriminatory Policy Change 
 
 Positive 
Linguistic DPC 
Negative 
Linguistic DPC 
Proposed 
Linguistic DPC 
Followed by ethno 
political violence 
4 
(40%) 
2 
(100%) 
3 
(60%) 
Total DPC 10 2 5 
 
 
By comparison, there were seven cases of religious discriminatory policy changes 
(three negative and four positive in nature).  Only two cases (one negative) were followed by 
ethno political violence, and another two (one negative) by protest.  Surprisingly not only are 
religious policies apparently less frequent in India, but they are also seemingly less volatile 
than their linguistic counterparts. 
The majority of the identity-based policies identified in the study were considered 
economic and/or political in nature (although there was some overlap where a particular policy 
might be considered both economic/political and either linguistic or religious if the policy 
legislated several benefits).  There were a total of 30 economic/political discriminatory 
policies.  Of those, 22 were positive in nature.  These policies were the least volatile (Table 5), 
with only three leading to ethno political violence and five leading to protest.  On the other 
hand, four of seven negative economic/political policies were followed by ethno political 
violence.  An additional negative economic/political policy was followed by protest. 
 
 
Table 5 
Economic/Political Discriminatory Policies 
 
 Positive 
Economic/Political  
DPC 
Negative 
Economic/Political 
DPC 
Followed by ethno 
political violence 
3 
(13.6%) 
4 
(57%) 
Followed by 
protest 
5 
(22.7%) 
1 
(14%) 
Total DPC 22 7 
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All discriminatory policy types, and particularly the “negative” ones, have been shown to 
result in ethno political violence at least some of the time.  On the other hand, despite our initial 
expectations for India, linguistic policies appear more volatile than their religious or 
economic/political counterparts.   
It has been hypothesized that resource disparities play a significant role in accelerating 
ethno political conflict.  When focusing on discriminatory policy changes, this variable seems 
theoretically relevant.  When resources are scarce, identity groups may feel the need to secure 
them for their group more so than when the economy is prosperous and healthy.  Data collection 
indicates 12 cases of events considered to entail economic downturns as reported by project 
sources.  Four (33%) of those were related to non-identity protest—for example, the left-wing 
trade union strike in 1967 protesting rising prices and unemployment—and three (25%) were 
related to non-identity violence (i.e. food riots).  Some cases of ethno political violence occurred 
during the same year as these economic declines, however we were unable to establish direct 
relations between the two event types.23  These findings do not, however, provide a systematic 
analysis of the relationship between economic fluctuation and the policy change-to-violence 
linkage as proposed earlier.   
In order to better make this assessment, Figure 1 is presented for the years after 1960, and 
identifies policy changes that were and were not followed by ethno political violence.  These 
changes were graphed in relation to percent change in GDP from previous year (the first year 
had no reference point).  In addition, the graph also indicates these changes and economic cycles 
in relation to party and prime minister shifts.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Leadership Change, Economic Fluctuation, and Discriminatory Policies 
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Intriguingly, incidents of discriminatory policy change (DPC) which were followed by 
violence seemed to come at relatively extreme points of economic change, i.e., either upward 
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economic shifts of over four percent, or downward shifts.  However, contrary to expectations, 
the upward shifts appeared more subject to such policy linkage to violent outbreaks than the 
downward shifts were (note that violence occurred in India nearly every year, so that the 
indicators are for the policy-violence sequence, and not for all occurrences of violence).  All 
instances of policy change NOT followed by violence during this period also occurred in the 
better economic times, with some of the non-violent outcomes coming coincidentally in the same 
year as the violent ones. Overall, then, one is hard pressed to conclude that economics made 
much difference.  Bad economic times did seem, however, to correspond to the possibility of 
violence following discriminatory moves, and not to the policy-non-violent outcomes.   
As for political changes, the first two prime ministerial changes and the first party shift 
were followed rather closely by ethno political policies and subsequent violence.  However, this 
pattern was not as clear for later governmental shifts, either of party or leadership, and it could 
have been that in the early years the nation’s first ethno political policies were being enunciated 
and coincidentally that prime ministers finally changed (after the long Nehru reign).  During the 
more conservative shift of the 1980s and 1990s, there may indeed have been a great deal of 
“ethnic politics” going in, especially with Hindu nationalist revival.  Yet these evidently did not 
necessarily translate predictably into policy moves followed by near term violence.  Fears of 
ethnic repression or intimidation, however, might have led to an atmosphere leading to 
communal fighting, whether associated with specific policies or not. 
 
Implications 
 
It seems clear that discriminatory policy changes in India are not the only source or 
trigger of ethno political violence.  In fact, the majority of such violent acts seem to occur 
rather spontaneously as the result of a street-level disagreement in a pattern of continuing 
conflict and vengeance.  Future research is required to shed light on these episodes to assist in 
reducing the tension and atmosphere that makes spontaneous violence possible. We also have 
not distinguished between ethnic violence directed at other groups and at the state, so that we 
would want to know more about what triggers one form versus the other.   
It is also clear, however, that discriminatory policies, when they do occur, often lead to 
violence or identity-based protest, with negative discriminatory and proposed policies proving 
considerably more volatile than the positive variety, although opposition to positive policies, 
particularly from groups which stand to lose some of their previous advantages or status, can 
become violent as well.  The potential of violent outbreaks as a result of discriminatory policy 
seems to be related to the focus and location of that policy.  India’s attempts to strike a balance 
with some devolved ethno-related powers and a still strong central government seem to have 
created a system in which regional discriminatory policies are more likely to lead to violence 
than those adopted at the national level.   
Future research comparing Indian policy with other more or less centralized countries 
might provide useful insight into this issue and the adequacy of the balance.  We have only 
been able to highlight what appears to be an interesting difference in central and regional 
policy effects.  Indian democracy has generated a distinctive and somewhat successful pattern 
of positive policy initiatives to deal with the challenges of heterogeneity.  Indeed Das Gupta 
(1988, p.165) argues cogently from the Assamese example that ethnic struggles are frequently 
over who will control the country’s resources and that given enlightened policies at the center 
“ethnic regionalism and secular nationalism are not necessarily competing values.” 
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 Project results illustrate the problematic nature of dealing with a diverse 
linguistic population via linguistic policy, especially in comparison to religious discrimination 
per se.  Such policies and demands often are associated with violence, indicating the sensitive 
nature of language and the importance of language recognition.  Again, cross-country 
comparative analyses are necessary to explore methods of appeasing several linguistic groups 
without the problem of creating a “within minority.” 
 If discriminatory policy is a catalyst of violence, it is evidently not as 
intertwined with other factors as one might have assumed.  For example, one factor commonly 
linked to ethnic violence, economic downturns, seemed at least as likely to be related to non-
identity based policies, demonstrations, and violence.   The sequences whereby discriminatory 
policy led to violence, at least in our data, generally were not very long, with the most common 
sequence being policy leading to protest leading to violence.  However, negative policy per se 
seemed quite capable of directly generating violent uprisings.  Therefore, such policy, whether 
proposed or implemented, bears watching by those interested in early warning or amelioration 
of ethnic violence.  Again, one would want to see the patterns in other states, but India affords 
an important initial validation, especially as regards the incendiary potential of linguistic 
policies. 
 
Endnotes 
 
* We would like to thank Emily Kanaga, Sonja Mann, Bappaditya Mukherjee, and Mayuko 
Shimakage for their excellent research assistance, and Dr. Kousar Azam for her encouragement, 
advice, and support.  We would also like to thank Steven Cohen for his comments on an earlier 
version.  The authors remain solely responsible for the content. 
 
1 We use the term “ethnic” or “ethnopolitical” conflict and violence in this paper to denote 
fighting over issues related to cultural identity.  This can encompass disputes regarding group 
identity, nationalism, language, religion, citizenship and other aspects of culture such as myths, 
traditions, and norms.  It overlaps with but is treated as distinct from disputes over other issues 
such as ideology, territorial control and power that might not have an ethnicity component.  
2 The idea of relative deprivation, translated from the individual to the group level, is seen as a 
discrepancy between a group’s value expectations and what the group is actually able to achieve.   
3 Factors in a group’s capacity for sustained collective action are the strength of the group’s 
identity and group mobilization.  Factors affording a group the opportunity to initiate 
ethnopolitical rebellion include recent major changes in the structure of the political regime and 
support from kindred groups in neighboring countries.  Where Gurr focuses on the interaction of 
many structural and institutional factors in assessing risk of internal civil conflict and 
Stavenhagen looks at the nation-state system, Stuart J. Kaufman (1996) argues that hostile 
masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas drive internal ethnic warfare.  
“They reinforce each other in a spiral of increasing conflict:  belligerent leaders stoke mass 
hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders; and both together threaten other groups, 
creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership 
belligerence” (Kaufman, 1996: 109).  Kaufman also makes a distinction between wars initiated 
by dominant groups, which he terms ‘popular chauvinism’ (mass-led) and ‘government 
jingoism’ (elite-led), and those initiated by subordinate groups, or ‘mass insurgencies’ (mass-
led) and ‘elite conspiracy’ (elite-led). 
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4 While they may pose challenges for multi-ethnic states, Barnett and other scholars of India 
note that separatist movements need not be incompatible with national integration, providing 
that integration is not seen as synonymous with homogenization and that cultural pluralism is 
genuinely accepted (Brass, 1981, p. 452). 
5 One area of inter-ethnic coexistence in the religious domain is the general Indian pattern of 
tolerance in return for acceding to the basically Hindu social order.  Hindus have come to 
expect this in relation to the ancient absorption of Buddhism, and it created difficulties relative 
to the Sikhs in the 1980s (Mahmood, 1989). 
6 Horowitz (1985) and Kaufman (1996) join scholars such as Merton (1957) and Gagnon 
(1995) in enunciating what has been termed the “instrumentalist” view of civil violence, in 
which national elites are seen to exploit group antagonisms for concrete political or territorial 
gains.  An alternative conception is the so called “primordialist” view that most ethnopolitical 
conflicts are rooted either in human nature as deep-seated tribal hatreds (Huntington, 1996) or 
long evolving cultural suspicions and rivalries.  For example, Barber (1995) argues that 
“tribes” who are at war with each other are trying to redraw boundaries in order to further 
divide the international system.  Despite assumptions about tribal hatreds, however, ethnic 
differences appear to play a relatively small role in the onset and resolution of violent 
international disputes (Huth, 1995).  Singer (1993) has begun to explore the validity of the 
primordialist view on intrastate conflict, and finds that “cultural difference does not necessitate 
conflict; rather, it only makes it easier for elites to move their societies closer to hostility and 
rivalry” (Henderson, 1997).  Singer (1996) also argues that to dismiss these intrastate conflicts 
as tribal hatreds is dangerous if not patronizing, and prematurely assumes that we already know 
what the conflicts are about.  Such conflicts are complex processes about real issues that need 
further analysis, as seen in Subrate K. Mitra’s (1995) critique of Asghar Engineer’s (1994) 
thesis that “ethnicity derives its strength from primordial identity,” while in India Muslims 
have made relatively successful political alliances with former Hindu untouchables.  By 
contrast, Dutt’s (1976) instrumentalist and pro-Congress analysis of the Indian constitutional 
crisis blamed political and opposition agitators for combining anti-democratic themes with 
ethnic hatred to gain power for themselves and bring down both the government and 
democratic structures. 
7The added dimension of economic dislocation and modernization as well as class-based 
politics inevitably comes into discussions of ethnic or identity conflict.  Based on case studies 
in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, Horowitz (1985) generates a theory of group entitlement 
and inter-group comparison, arguing that differential modernization based on ethnicity is an 
important factor for understanding the collective psychology of identity conflicts.  He argues 
that the “modernization gap” and elite ambitions taking advantage of accompanying 
psychological tensions have resulted in post-colonial states where elites have the ability to turn 
group fears and resentment into mass antagonism and war. Modernization theory entails the 
belief that ethnic groups modernize at differential rates, and as a result, there is inter-group 
competition for benefits.  The uneven distribution of economic and educational resources, 
according to Horowitz, is an important source of group tensions.  One might also speculate that 
economic hardships, and their differential effects on various dominant or subordinate groups, 
can hasten the resort to force. 
8 Indeed one type of institutional arrangement militating against inter-ethnic violence might be 
the form of “civic engagement” in crosscutting associations and groups that tend to break down 
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polarization.  This has been seen among Hindu’s and Muslims in cities where violence has 
been minimized or abated (Varshney, 2001, noting that most Indian civil violence takes place 
in cities rather than in India’s myriad of villages). However, there are conditions where these 
consultative networks and associations might not suffice, as in the former Yugoslavia, either 
because the associations are not prominent, large, and well enough organized or because they 
are overtaken by events.   
9 Citing a study by Oldenburg (1993) Manor notes that Indian communal (religious) incidents 
peaked in the mid 1960s, and despite a general rise in the 1980s did not approach those levels 
again up to 1990.  Others have noted a marked increase again in the 1990s, however.     
10 Indeed Basu and Kohli note the irony that this trend has coincided with the 
“deinstitutionalization” of the Indian state, i.e., the fall of previous pillars such as secularism, 
socialism, and Congress Party democracy and the deterioration of civil and political 
bureaucracies.  The electorate has multiplied and competition over resources distributed by the 
state has intensified along with inter-party competition and grassroots democracy.  They further 
note that state policy can be either direct and intended or indirect and unintended in its impact 
on subsequent protest and violence.  Indeed state inaction in key situations can also be a form 
of policy by default. 
11 These authors also note (pp. 323-324) that ethno cultural identities themselves change and 
transform over time, especially as transformed into political movements that wax and wane.  
Again the role of the state and political leaders is considered crucial in negotiating such 
changes.   
12We presume that although mere proposals for adoption might also spark violence, crowds 
and groups react more vehemently to actual regulations in place than to plans and proposals, 
since discussion of various approaches is always taking place and policy does not become 
really “serious” until it is approved and on the way to implementation.   
13In cases where there is a complete state breakdown, where no policies could be made, 
presumably the discriminatory policy change could have occurred prior to the breakdown and 
may have served as a catalyst to that fact.  
14 Since Keesings Contemporary Archives Online was only available from 1960-2000, for the 
earlier years we supplemented the data with the Political Handbook of the World (1998).  
However, since the latter is not as comprehensive as Keesings, the findings before 1960 must 
be treated as reliable but less authoritative than for the 1960-2000 period.  Separate analyses 
were completed for the latter period for comparison with the entire period, 1947-2000, but the 
findings did not change substantially. 
15 While one would also want to account for the outcome “no policy reform-no violence” the 
event data approach we utilize at present does not afford that as a practical measurement since 
those are essentially “non-events.”  One could alternatively deal with “country or event years” 
and code zeros for years with no such activity, but the effort here was to go to the event level 
itself in order to see sequences by which action and reaction in the policy-violence nexus 
actually occur.  At the initial stage of investigation it is important to look closely at these 
sequences in order to induce theoretical propositions for further systematic testing. 
16 If outcomes and effects were noted beyond three months, and were clearly related in the 
account to policy initiatives, they were coded as well.  
17 Obviously groups can interpret a policy in widely contrasting ways, and a certain subjectivity 
is inherent in such coding.  Language laws may validate one community and invalidate its 
41 Peace & Conflict Studies   Olson Lounsbery & Pearson 
  
 
neighbors; U.S. affirmative action is seen as just in some quarters and discriminatory in others.  
However we treated such policies as negative if their effects were highly unbalanced or 
unfavorable to minorities. 
18 The reasoning for such a decision is two-fold:  first, reports of specific violent regional 
episodes tend to be sporadic and rarely detailed (for example, a report of ‘continued violence in 
Kashmir’ provides very little insight into the level of violence or its circumstances), and 
secondly, the project is concerned with identifying potential causes of violent outbreaks (hence 
its potential usefulness in “early warning”) as opposed to continuous episodes.  As a result, 
initial and renewed (after a distinct lull of at least a year in reports) instances of violence were 
the focus of data collection.  There is one particular exception.  Hindu/Muslim communal 
violence is a recurring Indian problem, and can take a number of forms.  The difficulty in 
identifying this violence as ‘continual’ is that it rarely occurs only in a specific region, so that 
one does not know whether reports of violence in various regions is part of a single conflict or 
indicative of several conflicts.  Therefore, if we did not know enough about the particular 
circumstances to say it was or was not a continuation of prior local fighting, this type of 
violence was coded as a new event whenever it was reported.   
19 Volume 2001 was used to identify percent change in GDP from previous year for the years 
1971-2000.  Volume 1971 was used for the years 1960-1970. 
20 Data analyzed in the study are available by contacting the authors. 
21 An example of such a policy was the 1965 Official Language Bill, replacing English as the 
official language in India with Hindi.  Although the bill also required regulation to ensure that 
the change would not cause any hardship to those who did not speak Hindi, the action 
nonetheless sparked a series of riots in several Indian states by those opposed to the bill who 
viewed it as a threat, as well as those who supported the bill and viewed its opponents as a 
threat. 
22 Due to the nature of the reports used for coding, it was not always possible to determine 
whether a policy was passed by the state or national government, but it was possible to 
determine whether it applied locally or nationally.  We assume that many of the local policy 
moves were passed by state authorities, and we were further able to distinguish clear national 
policies that affected only a state (such as the Bombay reorganization bill of 1960 which 
created two separate states).  Thus, our analysis distinguishes local from national policy. 
23A second analysis was completed using Gross National Product (GNP) as the economic 
indicator for the years 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995.  These were compared to 
the outbreak of violence grouped in  
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